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A Note from the Editors:

The papers selected for this year's publication in *Zaytoon* journal demonstrate the intellectual, thematic and methodological diversity of Middle Eastern and North African studies as a field. The articles presented here illustrate a high quality scholarly work and the commitment of young academics to engage with a variety of issues ranging from political repression and artistic production in Iran, ethnopolitics in contemporary Mauritania and linguistic transition from Coptic to Arabic in early Muslim Egypt. It was a pleasure to work with the contributors to this volume and our colleagues from the review board.

Sincerely,
Tatiana Rabinovich
Feras Klenk
Zaytoon Co-Editors

Transition from Coptic to Arabic in Early Muslim Egypt:
An Attempt to Resolve a Sociolinguistic Puzzle

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Abstract

The spread of Arabic in Egypt is one of the most controversial areas of study in historical sociolinguistic research in medieval history. The transition from Coptic to Arabic is an intriguing puzzle in Medieval Egypt (Zaborowski, 2008; McCoull, 1985; Gamal, 1976). In this paper, I attempt to resolve this puzzle by charting the phases of Coptic disuse from 640 AD to the end of the eleventh century. In addition, I examine the change of the status of Coptic from an everyday language into a domain language over five centuries. The paper explores a complex matrix of factors that led to that change: social, linguistic, political and religious. It analyzes relevant historical narrative searching for the manifestations of language planning policies that the Arabs developed after the conquest. These include what Al-Maqrīzī and Al-Kindi wrote. It also analyzes relevant parts of Apocalypse of Samuel of Qalamūn (ASQ) in the seventh century and Kitāb al-Īḍāḥ and the Arabic History of the Patriarchs of Alexandria (AHPA) by Severus Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (b. 905-d. 987) in the tenth century. The paper concludes with a complex matrix of factors, each of which played a role in the spread of Arabic and the gradual disuse (not death) of Coptic. Both deliberate and indeliberate language planning policies came into interplay. The Muslim conquest in 640 AD led to a full linguistic Arabization and a partial identity one; the Coptic culture is still an integral component of Modern Egypt.

Key words: *Coptic, Arabic, Sociolinguistic, Language Disuse, Language Spread, Language Planning, Minority Language*

Introduction.

The spread of Arabic in Egypt remains one of the most controversial areas of study in historical sociolinguistic research in medieval history. Zaborowski (2008) talks about the "puzzle" of when and where Egyptian Christians began to "disuse" Coptic and replace it with Arabic as a lingua franca. Intrigued by the same puzzle, MacCoull (1985), argues that the Coptic language fell into disuse "at different times in different contexts," and the stages of disuse "remain to be charted, and cogent reasons for its death have yet to be brought forward as…[n]o one has yet been able to account for the death of the Coptic language"(p. 46). Mikhail (2004:148) discusses the rapidity of the transition from Greek and Coptic into Arabic. Gamal (1976:106) describes this transition as "a distinguished phenomenon in the history of human civilization." Bishai (1960, 1964), who surveyed only 109 Coptic words in Egyptian Arabic as compared to 264 Turkish

words surveyed by Littmann (1954), concludes that cross-pollination between Coptic and Arabic was short-lived due to the limited, influence of Coptic on Egyptian Arabic. Bishai attributes this small number of loan-words to the lack of widespread bilingualism in Egypt. It seems that the rapid spread of Arabic did not provide sufficient opportunities for longer interaction or contact between Arabic and Coptic after the conquest.

What creates this sociolinguistic 'puzzle' is that for centuries, Coptic co-existed with Greek and maintained its status without falling into disuse. What happened then when Coptic came into close contact with Arabic? Why did it fall into disuse? Resolving this sociolinguistic 'puzzle' requires an investigation into a complex matrix of socio-political, religious and linguistic circumstances in Medieval Egypt before, during, and after the Muslim Conquest. Many factors came into interplay in creating this matrix. Uncovering this interplay requires a multi-disciplinary approach that examines, both closely and objectively, literary historical and religious sources.

Egypt before the Muslim Conquest: Religious and Linguistic Background.

Before the Muslim conquest in 640 AD, Egypt was part of the Byzantine Empire whose capital was located in Constantinople. A decade before the conquest, Egypt was conquered by the Persian Empire under Khurshau II and remained part of the empire until 629 AD. The Byzantine emperor Heraclius re-captured Egypt after many successive campaigns against the Persians only to lose it again to the Muslims. Just prior to the conquest, the capital of Egypt was located n Alexandria although it was under the rule of the city of Memphis on the eastern bank of the Nile (Butler, 1978). At that time, it was the Greek- speaking class, and not the native Coptic- speaking Egyptians that occupied the most important positions in Egypt.

As for the religious scene, after the Greek emperor Heraclius reconquered Egypt, two religious orthodoxies dominated the empire: Egyptians believed in Monophysitism, an oriental Orthodox Christianity that holds that Christ has one united nature. The rest of the Byzantine Empire ascribed to the Chalcedonian or Melkite doctrine that maintains that Christ has two natures: one divine and one human. The Council of Chalcedon held in 451 AD ruled in favor of the Byzantine Orthodox doctrine. However, Egypt remained a stronghold of Miaphsitism, thus exacerbating Egypt's alienation from the rest of the Byzantine Empire.

The result of this division was a series of revolts against the Byzantine Empire; the Emperor Justinian made frequent attempts to "force the orthodox religion on the non-conforming Copts", and had his wife Theodora not to express any sympathy for the creed practiced by the Egyptians (Butler, 1978:3). Bitter strife arose between the two religious doctrines: Melkite imposed by the Byzantine Empire; and Monophysite that most Copts in Egypt believed in. In the word of Butler (1978:3), this strife "filled the whole horizon of thought and hope."

Thus, the political and religious circumstances prior to the Muslim conquest were defined by turmoil that led in some cases to the persecution of the Copts. Shedding light on the story of the strife, Butler (1978) writes:

> Now if there is one thing *indisputable* ….for the ten years preceding the time of
> the Arab invasion, and at that time, the Copts suffered the *severest persecution* at

the hands of Cyrus, the nominee of Heraclius as patriarch of Alexandria and governor-general of Egypt. It is certain also that the Copts had neither bishop nor leader in the city of Misr, since their patriarch and all their *prominent men* had been driven into exile into the mountains and deserts (p.27, italics mine).

It would be safe to conclude that this indisputable and severe persecution of the Copts at the hands of Cyrus paved the way for the Muslim conquerors. Indeed, many Copts looked forward to more freedom of belief and thus viewed the Muslims as the path to salvation for them.

Language contact between the Arabic and Egyptian languages (Greek and Coptic) began decades before the conquest, as Arabic was already used in some parts of Egypt. A document dating back to 263 AD discusses business relations between Arabs and Egyptians (Ali, 1993). Al-Kindi (b. 897-d. 961 AD) records that 'Amr ibn al-'Aṣṣ came to Egypt before the conquest as a trader and visited the delta and Alexandria. He may well have convinced the Caliph of the Muslims, 'Omar, to invade Egypt. Al-Maqrīzī (b.1364–d.1442), a Mamluk-era historian, recorded that the Arabs ruled one of the villages named "Koptos" before the conquest (ʿAbdīn, 1961). In addition, the Greek historian Herodotus recorded that the eastern parts of Egypt, along the shores of the Red Sea and the Nile, were populated by Arab tribes (Ali, 1993).

In addition, many tribes arriving through Sinai settled in Egypt before the conquest. Among them were the "Kahlani" tribes of Qaḥṭani origin from the south of Arabia who that made their home in the northern part of Egypt. These tribes also included "ṭāy'-طيىء" who lived in the northern part of Egypt, known today as al-Sharqiyya (which means the Eastern part 'of the delta') and the tribe of "Billa", who lived in the southern part of Egypt in Qina. The two Greek historians, Strab (66 BC) and Blenius (70 AD), recorded that the number of the Arabs living on the west bank of the Red Sea doubled. So intense were the immigrations of the Arab tribes into Egypt that they assumed rulership of entire villages (Omar, 1970: 12).

The number of Coptic words in the Quran supports the argument that there was significant contact between Arabic and Coptic before the conquest. The list of these words includes "qabas-قبس" meaning "a flash of light","baṭā'in-بطائن" referring to "internal parts of" or " "stomachs" "manās-مناص" that means "escape" and 'muzjah-مزجاه" that means "little"(al-Suyūṭī, Al-Itqān,: 139).

Thus, there was thus undeniable language contact between Arabic and Coptic in the years prior to the conquest. Arabic was not an entirely new language to the Egyptians. They knew about it, and most likely, some knew how to speak it. In addition, there were close business ties between traders from the peninsula and various parts of Egypt. These factors, undoubtedly, facilitated the introduction of Arabic into Egypt.

Sketching the linguistic landscape in Egypt before the conquest is key in understanding the rapid transition that took place from Coptic to Arabic. Gamal (1976) indicates that although Greek was the official language; it was the language of education, and the language of culture. Works of art were written mainly in Greek. Coptic was used as an everyday language, and it was not a literary language. Elaborating on this, Butler (1884) writes:

> The Copts can boast of no great poets, historians, philosophers, or men of science. Their only literature is religious: and the fact that they have neither witchery of speech nor treasures of knowledge to offer has caused their language to be treated with a strangely undeserved indifference (p. 247).

Although Coptic was neither the language of literature nor education, it co-existed with Greek for long centuries and it never fell into disuse. Gamal (1976) posits that in its co-existence with Coptic, it tool Arabic only three centuries to achieve its victory of Arabic over Coptic. Such victory was not possible for the Greek to achieve over Coptic for long centuries.

Thus, Egypt was a bilingual community even before the Arab Muslims; Coptic and Greek were used side by side although each had different functions. Greek was used mainly for writing. Many literary sources written in Coptic were translated into Greek. In addition, Greek became the language of the aristocracy and as such was more prestigious than Coptic, which was only used in everyday life by the illiterate and the common people. Social class and function thus became a real marker that determined language use. In addition to Coptic and Greek, some historians argue that Syriac was also used as a literary language of culture and claim that it was used at the old university of Alexandria (Omar, 1970).

Transition from Coptic to Arabic after 640 AD: Three Phases of Language Disuse.

A complex matrix of factors led to the spread of Arabic and the decline of Coptic in Muslim Egypt after 640 AD. It is important to note, however, that researching this period in mediaeval Egypt is hampered by historical disconnect in literary sources. However, a good deal of sociolinguistic and historical research can be substantiated by available literary sources in the periods under study here.

The history of the Coptic language in Egypt is a reflection of the history of the Copts themselves. During the Greek-Roman period, the Coptic language retained its status and resisted the language of the colonists. Identification with Coptic began to shift early on in the Arab conquest (Tajir, 1951:300). This change results in Coptic falling out of use at different times in different circumstances. MacCoull (1985: 46) indicates that charting the reasons for this decline at certain times is a difficult task due to the disconnection of historical sources.

There are different views on when the Coptic language fell into disuse. As there is no single date for language birth, there is similarly no single date for language death or disuse. The same applies to Coptic. Bishop Renaudot (Kāshif, 1993) argues that by the tenth or the eleventh century Arabic was the official language in Egypt, and Coptic was no longer in use. Tajir (1951) thinks that the disappearance of the Coptic language happened gradually, and by the eleventh century, it had completely faded away and was used only in monasteries and churches as a liturgical language. Al-Maqrīzī mentions that in the fifteenth century some women and children were still able to speak Coptic in Upper Egypt. Thus, we are faced by various opinions of when the status of Coptic changed from an everyday language into a domain language used only for liturgical purposes. What follows is an attempt to sketch the phases over which Arabic and Coptic changed their statuses.

Probably the most important event that made charting the disuse valid and creditable was the arabization of the Dawāwīn or state departments in 706 AD. Phase I dates from 640 AD and ends with the legislation of Arabizing the Dawāwīn in 706 AD. Although there is no exact date that marks phase II and III, I argue that it phase II starts with 706 AD and continues until the middle of the ninth century. Phase III starts from the eleventh century. It is important to note, however, that these phases are not mutually exclusive, nor does one specific date mark each one. This lack of specificity of dates is due to the disconnection in the available literary sources.

Phase I, which preceded the arabization of the Dawāwīn (640 AD-706 AD), is characterized by the use of Greek and Coptic side by side, with each for specific functions. There is some evidence for a trilingual situation with the Greek language as the medium of communication in case of misunderstanding. One early manuscript written by Bishop John at the registrar of the contracts and agreements, dating back to 642 AD, was written in Arabic and another was written in Greek (Tajir, 1951: 18). It is debatable in this phase, however, whether Coptic or Greek was the official language or whether Coptic was a co-official language. Arab sources indicate that the Coptic language dominated while European sources indicate that it was the Greek language (Mikhail, 2004). The rarity of works of art, literature, philosophy, science, history in Coptic and the plethora of these in Greek (See earlier reference to Butler (1884: 247)) makes it most likely that Greek was the official language with Coptic and Arabic as complementary languages. This phase was an extension of the bilingual situation before the conquest.

Phase II of Coptic disuse began with the legislation that oversaw the arabization of the Dawāwīn in 706 AD. This phase witnessed the change of the function of Arabic from a complementary language into an official language. Arabic began to be greatly used as an official language over Greek and Coptic. During this phase, both Greek and Coptic were still used in Egypt as second languages for fewer purposes in the Dawāwīn. Translation from Coptic to Arabic and vice versa was a common practice in this phase. Further, the status of Arabic changed from being a complementary language in Phase I into an official language.

It is still debatable whether Arabic was the only official language or both Coptic and Arabic were co-official languages. Coptic began to be used as the sole administrative language in the Dawāwīn when many Copts began to obtain state positions, replacing Greek employees. The distribution of the three languages (Greek, Coptic and Arabic) as attested by numerous documents written in the period from 675 to 775 AD was as follows: 85% written in Coptic, 9% in Greek and 6% in Arabic (Kahle, 1954:8). If this distribution were accurate, the premise that the Coptic language was widely used as an official language would be supported. However, modern historians argue that the majority of documents analyzed in the study of Kahle were fiscal and many others were damaged in monasteries and no longer available. Thus, this survey might not be accurate. Gradually, Arabic was used as the administrative language and many of the employees were urged to learn it. Translation from Coptic and Greek into Arabic was intensive. It seemed that the shift to learning and using Arabic was so quick; it has taken almost half a century to be widely used as an official language after the legislation of Arabizing the Dawāwīn.

The first source that deplores the disuse of Coptic language dates earlier to the seventh century. It is the Apocalypse of Samuel of Qalamūn (ASQ), a religious text

written in Arabic by the seventh century monk, Samuel of Qalamūn. It contains a sustained admonition against replacing the Coptic language with Arabic (Zaborowski, 2008:16). Since that text is only extant in Arabic-language manuscript, Zaborowski (2008:16) argues that it could have been composed originally in Arabic to enable Christians of the Fayyūm (where the manuscript was found) to access their Coptic heritage via an Arabic text. Copts, now Arabized, were losing their ability to read and understand Coptic literature. That is why they began to lose their Egyptian Christian religious identity.

   Although the date of the document is subject to debate, the text's rhetorical setting is a gathering with Samuel during the late seventh century in the province of Fayyūm. Much of the document discusses the social and religious circumstances after the Arab takeover of Egypt. It summarizes the Chalcedonian persecutions of the Copts as well as the persecution of the Copts by Muslims after the conquest. It is one of the most important sources, which discuss language contact between Arabic and Coptic. In this document, Samuel advises his disciples "not to let Christians speak Arabic"…

> Since you will find the Christians (al-Naṣāra) abandoning (yatrukū) their beautiful (al-ḥulwa) language and being proud (yaftakhirū) of the Arabic language and their [Arabic] names. (Paris Arabic 205, fol. 140r, lines 8-9, (translation mine)

The power of admonition in that text marks the beginning of using Arabic as an official and then an everyday language. In that phase, Coptic was still used in very limited contexts in churches and in prayers. It took around three centuries to be almost disused.

   Phase III, in which Arabic became the lingua franca, started approximately with the end of the 10th century (Omar, 1970). This phase marked the complete disuse of Coptic as an everyday language and replacing it with Arabic. The clergy gave considerable attention to the disuse of Coptic in that phase. Sawīrus ibn al-Muqaffaʻ (b.905-d. 987), who appears in the early portion of the Arabic History of the Patriarchs of Alexandria (AHPA), notes that the clergymen used Arabic as the basic lingua franca at the beginning of the 10th century to communicate with laymen. According to one manuscript of the AHPA, Sawīrus explained to his readers that he had sought help translating Coptic and Greek into Arabic, since most Egyptians only understood Arabic. He posited:

> "[t]hose Christian brothers of whose competence I am aware, I asked to help me translate that which we found written in Coptic and Greek into Arabic, which is—today—understood by the people of our time in the provinces of Egypt, most of whom do not speak Coptic and Greek." *(Tajir,* 1951:304, translated in Zaborowski, 2008).

Tajir (1951:304) confirms that Shakir Butrus Ibn Al-Rahib, *one* of the most famous writers of the 10th century, did not speak Coptic and wrote in Arabic instead. The disuse of Coptic, as viewed by Sawīrus ibn al-Muqaffaʻ(905-87), led to the lack of theological understanding of the Coptic principle of the Trinity. However, it did not lead to the loss of Coptic identity. The following quotation from Kitāb al-Īḍāḥ written in Arabic by Sawīrus ibn al-Muqaffaʻ sheds light on the loss of the original Coptic language:

I say that the reason this mystery [of the Trinity] is unavailable (kitmān) to believers is their mixing with foreigners (ʾikhtilāṭuhum bi-ʾajānibi) and the loss of their original Coptic language (wa-li-ḍayāiʿ lughatihim), through which they knew their doctrine (madhhabahum). Eventually, they only seldomly heard mention of the Trinity (dhakral-thālūthi) among them, and the Son of God was only mentioned among them meta-phorically (ʿala sabīli l-majāzi), but what they mostly hear is, "God is Single, Eternal," and the rest of this talk (al-kalām) which the others [i.e., Muslims] speak. The believers became accustomed to it (taʿawwada bihi) and [were] brought up in it, to the extent that the mention of the Son of God is embarrassing for them [yasụ ʿbu ʿalayhim], and they do not know an explanation for Him, nor a meaning (Translated in Zaborowski, 2008).

Regardless of the debate over the date, it is safe to say that the document deplores the gradual falling out of Coptic use by the beginning of the eleventh century. Warning in the text against the use of Arabic, the language of the Hijrah, at the altar suggests that the priests were still able to conduct prayers and other liturgies in Coptic.

Taken together, the three literary pieces discussed above, Kitāb al-Īḍāḥ, the Arabic History of the Patriarchs of Alexandria and the Apocalypse of Samuel of Qalamūn, strongly suggest that by the end of the tenth century, in which Sawīrus flourished, the Coptic language began its precipitous decline. (Zaborowski, 2008: 19). The plethora of documents existing in Arabic in the tenth and eleventh centuries by no means implies that Coptic was no longer in use. However, by the middle of the eleventh century, there were still some documents written in both Arabic and Coptic. Mikhail (2004) has noted that the Teshlot Papyri of the mid-eleventh century contain a letter written in Arabic from a man named Agathon to his friend Soucine, and a reply written back in Coptic from Soucine. This is a clear indication that the bilingual situation still existed in Egypt, or more accurately in the province of Fayyūm at that time.

Another document dating back to the tenth century shows that some Copts did not understand Arabic. In the University of Chicago Oriental Institute the document MS A6965, dated 946 AD contains an Arabic land contract documenting a sale of property in the Fayyūm. In it, an Egyptian Christian named Marqurah sold the land and "acknowledged his comprehension of [the contract] and his cognizance of it after it had been read to him in Arabic and translated for him by Muhammad." It was probably translated into Coptic. The document reads as follows in Arabic: "fāqirun bi-fahmihi wa maʿrifatihi baʿd ʾan qaraʾa ʿalayhi b-al-ʿarabiyyati wa tarjama lahu Muḥammad." (The Monasteries of the Fayyūm, 14. The Arabic, p. 7). These pieces of evidence lay support to the claim that Coptic was in use at least in Fayyūm even though it was losing its power as a lingua franca.

It is important to note that these three stages are not mutually exclusive, given that what is said about Upper Egypt may not apply to the Delta. It seems that there were variations in the language typologies of Coptic and Arabic according to the area in which both were used and to the degree of education of the conversant. In Fayyūm, where many manuscripts were found, may represent special case in which Coptic was still used until the tenth and the eleventh centuries. This might not be the case in other areas of Egypt.

What is safe is to conclude that the status of Arabic changed over these three phases from a minority language of the tribes that immigrated before the conquest, to a complementary language with the conquest. Then the status changed again into a co-official (with Coptic) and then the only official language after the legislation of Arabizing the Dawāwīn and finally into an everyday language by the tenth century. Copts, both authors and priests, wrote their literary works, history and religious sermons in Arabic. The last extant document in Coptic, the Martyrdom of John of Phanijōit written in Bohairic Coptic in 1211 is considered the endpoint of Coptic Arabic literature. Some argue that this document could be a translation into Coptic from an unknown Arabic manuscript (Zaborowski, 2008: 40). No longer conversant in Coptic, the clergy by the tenth century were preaching in Arabic that had become the lingua franca for all Egyptians, both Muslims and Copts.

Reasons for Disuse: In/Deliberate Language Planning Policies.

Religious Purposes: Spread of Islām.

Throughout the three phases of interaction between Arabic and Coptic, it was the spread of Islam that was the common denominator in all cases. Gamal (1976:108) views intersection between Arabizing the Dawāwīn and the spread of Islam. According to Mikhail (2004), the "times of increased religious conversion were followed by a proportionate, though staggered, increase of the Arabic language. Religious conversion resulted in linguistic and cultural changes." (P.170). Learning Arabic was one of the gateways for obtaining knowledge about Islam. However, some historians argue that the main motive for learning Arabic was linked to personal interests rather than a desire to convert to Islam. In some case, many non-Muslims had to learn Arabic to keep their position in the departments of the new Muslim state. But in some other few cases (as in the reign of Omar Ibn A'bdel A'zīz, al-Mutawakil and al-ḥākim) non-Muslims were temporarily converted to Islam and then re-converted to Christianity (al-A'tābiki, 1930:178) once they accomplish some personal benefits.

Many who have written about Medieval Egypt see a strong relationship between Islam and the spread of Arabic. Omar (1970:22) argues that the Coptic language was widespread in the areas in which Islam was not well known. De Lacy O'Leary (1934: 244) views "the spread of Islam [as] one of the factors that led to replacing the Coptic language with Arabic." Tajir (1951: 302) considers conversion to Islam as the second most important reason for the spread of Arabic. He thinks, "[t]he increasing numbers of those [who] converted to Islam and deserted the language of their grandfathers" weakened the position of Coptic language.

There are many reasons that account for the spread of Islam in Egypt. One was the troubled religious atmosphere just prior to the conquest. The debates between conflicting orthodoxies led to a constant fluctuation between the Miaphsitism and Chalcedonian doctrines. These obstruse debates led many to convert to the new religion of Islam, which seemed simple and straightforward (Arnold, 1935; Gamal, 1976). To those Copts, Muslim conquest brought a freedom of religious life such as they had not enjoyed for a century. Summing up this newfound tolerance Arnold (1935:87) writes:

"On the payment of the tribute, ʿamr left them in undisturbed possession of their churches and guaranteed to them autonomy in all ecclesiastical matters, thus delivering them from the continual interference that had been so grievous a burden under the previous rule; he laid his hands on none of the property of the churches."

In comparison to the severe persecution the Copts experienced at the hands of Cyrus, ʿAmr ibn al-ʿAṣṣ, the first Muslim ruler, practiced religious tolerance. Such tolerance led them to be more suspicious of Christianity so many of them converted to Islam, as its essence was clear and straightforward. The Letter of Treaties that ʿAmr gave to the people of Egypt made it certain that they are safe in their churches, houses, and crosses (al-Tabari: 109).

A second reason why the Copts who converted to Islam learned Arabic was to keep their positions in the departments (Dawāwīn) of Muslim Egypt. The converts to Islam enjoyed other benefits such as the lowering of tribute payment (Ibn ʿabd Al-ḥakam: 56-66). Further, they enjoyed equal rights with their Muslim conquerors. During the reign of Muʿāwiya, only five thousand dinars in tribute were collected, in comparison to twelve thousand during the reign of ʿamr (Gamal, 1976:109). In addition, converting to Islam often gave people the option of paying no tribute whatsoever. This made the ruler of Egypt in the reigns after Muʿāwiya think of requiring those who converted to Islam to pay the tribute; the matter that angered ruler of the Muslim Empire, ʿOmar Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿazīz,who wrote to the ruler of Egypt Hayyan Ibn Shuriyyḥ saying his famous quote that God sent Muhammad to guide people and not to collect tributes (Inna Allaha Baʿatha Muhammadan dāʿiyyan wa-līsa Jābiyyan (Ibn Saʿd: 238).

Regardless of the heated debate over whether or not the Copts were forced to convert to Islam, the spread of Arabic throughout the three phases was primarily due to conversion. To be a Muslim, one should know the language. To know about the new religion and the prophet, learning Arabic was an asset. When Al-Mutawakil ordered that high positions not be occupied by non-Muslims, some Copts converted to Islam to retain their positions. Over the first thirty years after the conquest, large numbers of them converted to Islam.

The numbers of those who converted to Islam varied widely over the three phases of spread of Arabic. Phase II, as indicated by Omar (1970), witnessed an increase in the numbers of converts to Islam as a result of a set of factors: the strength of religious movements in Egypt, the struggle between various orthodoxies and the material benefits in the form of tax exemption.. Al-Maqrīzī and *Severus* Ibn Al-Muqafaʿ also noted the increasing numbers of converts in the eighth century AD /second century H.

Thus for both religious and social reasons, converts had more to gain by learning Arabic than by continuing to use Coptic. By the time the second generation of Copts married and procreated, the language of their grandparents was almost forgotten. This happened over the course of fifty years and was facilitated by the lack of a pressing need to learn Coptic (Mikhail, 2004: 154).

Immigration and Intermarriage.

The second reason that led to the spread of Islam was immigration of Arab tribes before, during, and after the conquest. The wave of immigrations led to increased assimilation of the Coptic community with the Muslims. These immigrations, as Gamal (1976) claimed, were not only related to the army, but rather they were driven by economic, religious political and tribal reasons. The tribal nature of the Arabs maintained the immigrations over time after the conquest. The Arab rulers used to accompany with them men from their tribes, especially the most powerful ones. When ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Ibn Marwān, was assigned as the new ruler of Egypt, he asked his father to send with him some of his tribe, the matter that he refused urging the new ruler to be charitable and just (al-Kindi: 69).

During phase II of the spread of Arabic, large numbers of Arab tribes migrated to the shores of the Red Sea and settled in villages there. Al-Maqrīzī mentions that some members of the qayyis tribe immigrated to Egypt where some of them ruled entire villages. The total number of immigrants ranged from three to five thousand by 727 AD/109 H. Al-Maqrīzī writes:

> Islam did not spread in the villages of Egypt until the first hundred of the history of the hijra when ʿubayyid Allah Ibn Al-H̲abbāb sent beni Saloul from the tribe of qayyis down to the eastern part. By the year of two hundred of Hijra, Muslims spread all around in villages and corners of Egypt. (Al-Bayyān wa-al-I'rāb ʿama Bi-ard̲ Miṣr min Al-iʾʿrāb, translation mine).

During phase III, waves of immigrations increased immensely. Many tribes, including those of Al-Kinz, Hilal and Salim, migrated in during the reign of Al-Mutawakkil in 845 AD. Thus, by the end of the fourteenth century, the Copts made up only a tenth of the total population of Egypt due to these immense tribal migrations. Intermarriage between Copts and Muslims because of immigration also played a role in the ascendancy of Arabic. Along with intermarriage came a pressing need for Copts to learn Arabic. Intermarriage between a convert and a life-long Muslim predisposed the children of that union to become Muslims and hence to learn Arabic (Mikhail (2004: 145) for daily interaction and at religious schools or the kuttāb.

In addition to intermarriage, other factors led to the assimilation of Copts and Muslims into one single community. In 833 AD, the Abbassid Caliph Almu'taṣim ordered the ruler of Egypt to lay off Arab soldiers from the army and replace them with Turkish ones. This decree in Omar's view (1970: 47), led to greater assimilation of Muslims and Copts in one community, although it decreased the power of the Arabs in Egypt. As a result, Arabs began to find more opportunities in agriculture and business, which in turn led to greater intermarriage and hence subsequent assimilation with the Copts.

Arabizing the Dawāwīn.

Probably the second most important factor that contributed to the spread of Arabic was the central decree of Arabizing the Dawāwīn. It took the Arabs approximately 60

years after the conquest to accomplish this during the reign of Abdel Malik Ibn Marawān. This led the Copts to learn Arabic (Butler, 1978: 391). This decree was in fact put into force gradually. The Arabs were crafty in that they employed Copts who were familiar with the work conditions and whose experience and knowledge could be of use to the Arabs (Gamal, 1976). The Arabs thus utilized the Copts in managing administrative departments such as tax collecting and running the courts. In addition, they allowed Coptic to be used more frequently in daily life (Atiya, 1968: 105).

The Coptic language also appeared side by side with Arabic for writing on papyri. During the reign of Omar Ibn Abdel Aziz, a letter was sent to the ruler of Egypt Ayoub Ibn Sharḥābil asking him not to assign higher authority and power to Copts over Muslims (al-Maqrīzī: al-Khuṭaṭ: 568, part 1). In 805 AD, the caliph al-Mutawakil decreed that no Jew or Coptic was authorized to occupy a high position in the Dawāwīn. However, there were exceptions since Copts were allowed to be rulers of villages in some parts of Egypt. Atiya (1968: 106) indicates that after the Dawāwīn had been arabized, Coptic continued to be used freely in liturgical rituals inside churches.

Economic Reasons.

The spread of Arabic was also connected to the economic landscape of the time. Many Coptic employees had to learn Arabic in order to keep their positions in the Dawāwīn that had been arabized in the seventh century. In addition, many taught their children the language of the conquerors in order to ensure them future government appointments. This invoked the ire of Apocalypse of Samuel of Qalamūn as indicated in the introduction (Mikhail, 2004: 145). Further, moving to an urban center of a Muslim community especially during the Umayyad period accelerated the learning of Arabic. As Arabic was the medium of communication in the new empire, business relations depended on mastering the language for business purposes.

Translation.

In addition, translation was an effective corpus planning policy used to spread Arabic in the newly conquered land. Mikhail (2004: 132) claims that throughout the first 60-80 years Arabic played a supplementary role to Greek. It is commonly believed that Arabic translations were made of most letters and decrees originally issued by the Arab government in the Greek language. However, this claim is challenged by Kosei Morimoto (1994) who asserts that even the texts that were intended for the Arab Muslim community, such as those used in the Diwān, were compiled in Greek. This was not surprising given that Christian scribes were in charge of compiling these decrees and letters.

What is attested in literary sources such as the early eighth century correspondences between the governor Qurrah Ibn Malik and the pope Basililios is that Arabic translations usually post-date the Greek versions. This indicates that Greek documents were the basis for the bureaucratic structure of early Islamic Egypt. During the reign of Al-Aṣbagh, Abdel Azīz Ibn Marawān assigned one of the bishops at that time to translate the Bible and other Coptic books from Greek into Arabic (Omar, 1970: 24).

The Rise of Cairo as an Outstanding Cultural Center by the 10th Century.

One last factor that strengthened the spread of Arabic in Egypt in Phase III in the tenth century was the emergence of Cairo as a major cultural center for knowledge and science (Amīn, 1959:190). For Omar (1970:56) the tenth century was a turning point in the history of Arabic in Egypt as Arabic became the language of literature and culture for both Muslims and Copts.

Opportunities abounded for learning Arabic for those who wanted to work as writers or scribes in the Dawāwīn. Sciences of the Quran and ḥadith developed substantively and attracted numerous scholars. Many Egyptians became widely known for their Qur'anic recitations such as Othman Ibn Saʻīd, known among recitors as Warsh (b.728-d.812 AD). Other figures visited Egypt in the tenth and eleventh century such as Abou Hourayrra, the most widely known narrator of the prophet's traditions.

The enormous development and growth of Islamic studies in Cairo and other parts of Egypt led to the strengthening of Arabic as a literary language. Many books were written in Arabic in the field of Quran studies and ḥadith interpretation by leading figures as Abou Gaʻfar Al-Naḥās. Also, there was a growing interest in the art of writing in Dawāwīn Al-I'inshā'(Dept. of Official Correspondences) which aimed at training young writers to become better professionals and scholars. This document became the manifesto for young writers.

Another field of study that consolidated the position of Arabic was the remarkable increase in Arabic linguistic studies in the eleventh century. Omar (1970: 60-65) shows that Egyptian linguists and grammarians were first influenced by immigrant linguists as Abou Gaʻfar Ahmed Ibn Abdullah Ibn Muslim and ʻabd Al-Rahmān Ibn Hurmuz (d. 739 AD), the disciple of Abou Al-'swad Al-Do'ally, and Al-a'khfash. Three Egyptian grammarians became widely known in the tenth and eleventh centuries: Ali Ibn Al-ḥasan Al-Hana'i (d.922), Abou Al-ʻabas Ahmed Ibn Muhammad Ibn Wallād (d. 943) and Abou Gaʻfar Al-Naḥḥās (d. 950 AD). These grammarians and other literary figures used to meet in cultural centers that included mosques and the seminars (salūnāt) held at rulers' palaces. With the development of Arabic linguistic studies, Arabic spread and Coptic fell into disuse as the lingua franca.

Closing Thoughts.

Does language disuse imply language death? I think Coptic is an example of language disuse and not death for it is still used for liturgical proposes. Today it has lost most, though not all, of its functions. Coptic in Egypt now is considered as a domain language just as liturgical Hebrew is. The incomplete disappearance of Coptic happened gradually over time, as a country shifted to a different language.

Dorian (1981) draws the distinction between language disuse resulting from the extinction of native speakers and that resulting from a gradual shift to a different language. The case of Coptic combines both. The language fell into disuse because of the spread of Arabic, which became the lingua franca throughout Egypt. In addition, with the spread of religious schools and translation movements from Coptic into Arabic, native speakers gradually became extinct. The case of Coptic is comparable to that of Gaelic, the minority language in Scotland studied by Dorian (1981); those who did not convert to

Islam in Muslim Egypt became a minority, but with the difference that it did not die completely. The disuse of Coptic can be explained in the light of Dorian's (1981) categories of domain, interlocutor and function and topic. Over three to four centuries the functions and domains of Coptic changed dramatically from being a second official language in Phase I into a disused language or a domain language in Phase III in its relation to Arabic.

As for trying to account for Coptic disuse in the light of the grammar theories as proposed by Dorian (1981) in terms of markedness and naturalness, there is insufficient Coptic data to enable us to analyze Coptic disuse from this perspective. In addition, the issue of script presents another challenge to the attempt to apply this approach. Attempts to establish a relationship between the grammar and phonology of Egyptian Arabic and Coptic were not plausible, as Coptic disappeared over the course of three centuries.

The victory of the Arabic language should not suggest that Coptic had no influence on Arabic. Language effect was bidirectional with varying degrees in language systems. Contact with Coptic was an important catalyst in the development of lexical items in Egyptian Arabic. There are approximately 109 loanwords from Coptic in Egyptian Arabic (Bishai, 1964). There is little evidence of Coptic's influence on Arabic on terms of grammar and syntax (Omar, 1970) with the exception of negation (Lucas and Elliott, 2010). Its strongest influence is felt in the domain of loanwords.

There is no one single factor that accounts for the puzzle of the spread Arabic and the disuse of Coptic. Many factors came into play simultaneously, interacting with both deliberate and non-deliberate planning policies.

The spread of Arabic and the disuse of Coptic in Medieval Egypt may well be considered as the arabization of language, but not of identity. Given the fact that there is no historical interconnection between literary sources that date the disuse of Coptic and the use of Arabic, the sources that discussed Coptic identity were mainly written in Arabic. Even if Copts now speak Egyptian Arabic, the Coptic language is still considered as a symbol of Coptic Christian identity. The case of Coptic in Egypt throughout its long history after the Muslim conquest is similar to that of many minority languages. Hebrew, for example, prior to the revival enterprise was limited to liturgical purposes only. However, the Coptic language acted symbolically as a unifying and affiliating factor for all Copts even after it fell into disuse.

Briefly, although Copts are mostly arabized, Coptic identity is still an integral part of a deeply rooted Egyptian culture. Coptic now contains a linguistic capital with which all Copts identify. It is viewed as the true language of Copts and Christianity, while Arabic is viewed as the language of Islam.

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The Migration of Iranian Art to Internet

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Abstract

As always, when a new technology emerges, artists try to use it and adapt their works. The development of Internet at the end of the 1990's created new opportunities and new ways to show artworks. In Iran, the theocratic regime imposes very strict rules on artistic production and presentation. For many years after the 1979 revolution a large part of the art scene was silenced. This is why the most successful artistic works in Iran that do not submit to the regime's laws and values are less likely to be broadcasted in the mainstream media and can only reach a limited number of people. As a result, these artists have to find other platforms for showing their work. In these circumstances, Internet has been helping underground Iranian artists in showing and developing their work. Focusing on art and Internet in contemporary Iran also means talking about politics. In Iran Internet is censored and limited by the obstacles and labyrinths created by the religious power. Because there are political reasons of Iranian art's "migration" to Internet, I will first explain how artwork is censored and how artists are repressed in Iran. Then I will explain when this phenomenon originated and how it has developed by using two examples: the underground music and the political cartoons.

Key words: *Iranian Art, Internet, Censorship, Repression, Underground Music, Political Cartoon.*

Introduction.

As always, when a new technology emerges, artists try to use it and adapt their works. The development of Internet at the end of the 1990's created new opportunities and new ways to show artworks. In Iran, because of political reasons, some artworks can simply exist thanks to Internet. Because they are the reasons of Iranian art migration to Internet, I will first explain how artworks are censored and how artists are repressed in Iran. Then I will explain when this phenomenon started by using two examples: the underground music and the political cartoons.

Before going further, I must clarify that the migration of Iranian artworks to Internet spaces includes only a part of the Iranian contemporary art and not all of it.

Focusing on art and Internet in the contemporary Iran also means talking about politics to some extent. People who want to create a web site must have an official authorization, and Internet itself is censored and limited by the obstacles and labyrinths created by the religious power. A few simple examples can illustrate the different forms of Internet censorship in this country.

From the moment Internet became widely used the first law limiting its use was implemented. In 2001, the supreme leader Khamenei decided to legalize the filtering of Internet (1) and in 2002 a special committee (2) in charge of filtering Internet was created and closed 111 web sites. More than 5 million web sites had actually been filtered until 2008 (3). The filtering of Internet accelerated after the 2009 elections. Many web sites like Google, Facebook and Twitter as well as the websites of the two former presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami were filtered.

A bill called "National Internet" (4) was recently voted which will lead to get Iranian Internet out of the global network. In addition, in January 2011 a police unit called Fata (5) was created whose duty is to control Internet. A long list of "Internet crimes" (6) was drown up including for example the crime of insulting the supreme leader, acting against Islam and Islamic rules, and such. As soon as it was implemented this new police unit started to arrest people who had supposedly worked in anti-regime and anti-Islamic web sites, and public confessions of some of them were shown on state TV. The arrest, torture, and killing of the blogger Sattar Beheshti last November is one of the illustrations of this new repression against bloggers and Internet activists.

Nevertheless, 23 out of 77 million people use Internet in Iran (7), so it is the second country in the Middle East if we look at the number of users, and their number is increasing significantly every year. However, Iran has the most expensive Internet in the world and its speed is one of the slowest (8). 30 percent of Internet users in Iran use filter breakers, and it is considered a crime to use them (9). Unfortunately, Iranians are also victims of the filtering of some western web sites because of the international sanctions against Iran (10).

Iran is known to be one of the five countries in the world that are considered "enemies of Internet" (11), and it is in this very difficult context that some artists found in Internet the only place to show their work and bypass the governmental rules.

From Censorship to Repression.

Censorship and repression are the main reasons why a lot of Iranian artists have chosen Internet as their new art spaces. Censorship has a long history in Iran, but for a long time religious customs and traditions have been one of the barriers for art in this country. Music and sculpture have been considered a sin, and artists could not express their artistic opinions openly. Here is a quote by Majd ol-Islam (12) that is a good example of what the religious traditions were at the beginning of the 20th century in the city of Isfahan before the constitutional revolution: "the religious students used to walk in the city at night and attacked each place where music could be heard from, destroying everything on their way. All the musicians of Isfahan had to move to other cities" (13).

Following the Shah's fall, it was the Islamic Republic's turn to use censorship in order to stay in place. Censorship during the Shah's regime was state censored and sought to protect the royalty against intellectuals and to repress the freedom of

expression. For example, in 1974 Amir Abbas Hoveyda, the last prime minister during the Shah's regime closed down 63 newspapers in one day. The difference after the revolution was that the Islamic regime used religion to define a model of life for people who had no choice but to follow it. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, censorship takes different forms in people's lives. It has to do with clothing, social relations, movies, the TV, and books. All the books, newspapers and magazines must be authorized by the Ministry of Culture, and a special committee exercises censorship of plays, galleries, concerts, foreign films and books that contain scenes considered anti-Islamic or possibly damaging to the image of the regime. The list of books, films, and plays that were denied authorization or were banned is long. Books written by the clergy explain precisely to the Shiites how to live. They are called *Tozih-ol-masael* (explanations of issues). They show to what extent an Islamic type of government can be opposed to any kind of art.

Here are some examples of "artistic sins:" the broadcast of dance and music on TV; singing or entertaining people in public or reading Quran to the rhythm; buying or selling musical instruments; sculpting and buying sculpture; drawing and taking pictures of faces; dance is permitted only when performed by a wife for her husband (14).

In such an environment, artists, journalists, writers and other people have to censor themselves quite often. As an Iranian cartoonist Kambiz Derambaksh explained in a 2010 interview "Grimace of Death" for *Sharq* newspaper: "I have been sick for a long time. I had cancer. I spent a long time thinking about death and I had prepared a message for my gravestone that said: 'I still suffer from self-censorship. I had planned to write something on my gravestone but I did not dare'" (15). Not only do artists have to censor themselves, but also they face harsh repression from the Islamic regime. While censorship is directed against art works, repression means the arrest of a person whose crime is being an artist. In 1994 Said Sirjani (16), a writer who simply because he thought differently had been tortured for several months. He was forced to make confessions, criticize himself and then he was brutally murdered.

Of course, the number of arrests and repression of artists has increased since the 2009 elections (17). Thus, at the beginning of March 2010 the Iranian regime arrested a filmmaker Jafar Panahi and released him three months later. He supposedly was going to shoot a movie about the Green Movement. He was banned from making movies, writing scripts and traveling for a twenty-year period and was sentenced to six years in prison. Another example is the arrest of a pop singer Ariya Aram Nejad in 2010 by the regime because he sang a few songs for the Green Movement hiding his identity. He was released after two months. Two actresses, Pegah Ahangrani and Marzieh Vafamehr, were put in jail for some time because they supported the Green Movement, and a poet Hila Sadiqi was sentenced to a four month prison term, because of the poems she wrote for the Green Movement (18). These are just a few examples in a very long list of government abuse and crack down on artists and their work.

The Development of "Underground" Music.

If we want to understand the relation between art and Internet in Iran, we have to talk about underground music that appears mostly on Internet. After the Iranian revolution of 1979, music was faced with religious obstacles and could not be heard for a long period of time. Except for the revolutionary anthems and traditional music, other

music types were banned. Pop musicians migrated to Los Angeles, where the quality of their work deteriorated and where they had meager financial support and limited audience. They lost their access to professional studios, radio and TV channels of the Shah, who supported them. Because of the absence of professional lyricists, music composers, and musicians the quality of the music productions suffered. However, in the last ten years "Tehrangeles" pop music benefited from the arrival of young artists. Thus, the most famous Iranian pop singer Googoosh, who could not leave Iran for twenty years, arrived to California.

Rock musicians after the revolution were prohibited from playing music inside Iran. After the election of Khatami in 1997, the doors slowly opened for new types of music, but eight years later when Ahmadinejad came to power, all music that was considered "Western" was banned. These music genres survived thanks to Internet, and this is how underground music was born. It has to be said that there is a big difference between underground music in Iran and the one in the western countries. In Iran, the word "underground" is used for music that does not get authorization. Rock and metal bands were the first to play their music underground, because their styles and instruments were considered "Western" or "westernized" by the government. Underground music really developed from 2003 at a time when no authorization was given to live performances. Before that time authorization was almost never given, but there was some hope and on rare occasions some bands could play. Rock bands that performed live at that time were *Sokut-e Sharq* (Silence of the Orient), *Eliksir*, *Kahtmayan* and such.

After the 2005 elections, because there was no hope of organizing concerts, these rock bands and later rappers continued their activities underground (19). Not all underground bands in Iran blow the whistle on social-political climate. Some of them sing about basic issues that the regime considers unacceptable such as outside marriage relations or everyday life of young people and their ways of thinking. Indeed, most underground pop singers sing about simple love stories.

For the last twenty years, all Iranian pop music was produced in Los Angeles, but after Khatami was elected, such pop singers as Shadmehr Aqili, Mohammad Esfahani and others appeared in Iran. However, over the years due to the limitations imposed on them and their inability to compete with "Tehrangeles" and other underground pop singers, these few singers had to stop singing or leave the country. After a few years, some pop singers in Iran have gone underground and now most of the music produced underground is pop music. Their style is very popular. However, after having several successful underground albums, a lot of them managed to get an official authorization (e.g., Reza Sadeghi, Benyamin, Mohsen Chavoshi, and others). Some others singers like Hamid Talebzadeh immigrated to Los Angeles. In December 2012 the security forces announced that an underground band called *3BAND* was arrested and last year 80 people were arrested during an underground concert in Tehran. These arrests have always existed, and the chief of Tehran police said that he would take firm actions against any unauthorized music band or concert (20). Hopefully, some time in the future underground musicians from Iran will be able to perform abroad, as in August 2008 when 15 underground musicians gave a concert in Dubai.

Political Cartoon in Iran.

It can be argued that after music, political cartoon is the second largest artistic genre that finds expression on Internet. Contrary to underground music artists, caricaturists who put their cartoons online usually live outside the country. In fact, a large number of political cartoons disappeared from the newspapers in Iran and it led to the erosion of the freedom of the press in the country. A press law was passed in 2000. This law prevents journalists from publishing thoughts and beliefs that according to the Islamic regime "weaken or degrade Islam and undermine national security or public interest" (21). A broad interpretation of that law allows the government to judge and punish publishers and editors of newspapers whenever they want. At least a hundred newspapers have been banned since 2001 and more than 50 journalists have been put in jail. Since Ahmadinejad's appointment in 2005, repression against journalist has increased dramatically (22). In Iran, the regime considers political cartoon a very dangerous weapon. Consequently, political cartoonists who try, in one way or another, to satirize the government, Islam, or Islamic republic of Iran, are often severely punished. For example, in1992 the Iranian political cartoonist Manucehr Karimzadeh was sentenced to one year of prison because of a cartoon that criticized the poor condition of the Iranian football team. The picture showed a running football player who had his left foot and right hand amputated. The judges considered that the player depicted in the cartoon looked like Ayatollah Khomeyni. After he served one year in prison, he was forced to retire and later sentenced to 10 extra years in prison until he was finally released in 1994.

Unfortunately restrictions inside Iran continue, as the recent example of Mahmud Shakrai shows. In April 2012 he was condemned to 25 lashes for drawing a picture of Arak's (a city in central Iran) ex-deputy in parliament (23). Thankfully, because many people protested against this decision, this ex-deputy decided to withdraw his complaint. The list of Iranian cartoonist who have been arrested or repressed by the government is long. One of them, Mana Neyestani, is the most famous and active on the web. He is an Iranian political cartoonist who had been creating political cartoons between 1998 and 2006. He was arrested in 2006 for publishing a cartoon that showed a cockroach speaking Azeri. Titled "what can we do to prevent cockroaches from making us into cockroaches" this cartoon was printed in the child section of the weekly magazine "Iran Jomʿe." An Azeri expression was used in this comic strip, which is also common in Persian, and it created a misunderstanding followed by the protests in Azerbaijan. The regime used this pretext to kill and arrest several Azeri political activists (24) and. In addition, the publication of this cartoon caused the closure of the Iranian Friday newspaper and the arrest of its chief editor. After being granted provisional release before his trial, he decided to flee with his wife to Malaysia. He currently resides in Paris and publishes his highly political cartoons on Internet. Mana Neyestani's cartoons are related to the daily political events in Iran, and one the most famous ones is a series of cartoons that can be translated as "an involved family" (25) that tell a story of a family from the days of the Green Movement until today. A lot of Mana Neyestàni's work can be seen in the social media like Facebook and others.

Conclusions.

Obviously, Iran has known very few years without censorship or periods of freedom when artists were free to create and openly express their opinions. There was a short period after the constitutional revolution of 1904 and another period from 1941 to 1948 when Reza Shah, the first Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty, was overthrown. There was also a period between 1951 and 1952 when Mohammad Mossadegh was the Prime Minister, and a very short period after the 1979 revolution. Indeed, since the 1979 revolution, the Islamic regime has been saying that the revolution is continuing and therefore art has to serve the revolution. The regime considers that artistic expression as one of the many propaganda tools that must be used to transform the society. This transformation is only possible if the regime imposes a controlled system of propaganda to influence public opinion. Perhaps, this is why the most successful artistic works in Iran that do not submit to the regime's laws and values are less likely to be broadcasted in the mainstream media and, as a consequence, can only reach a limited number of people. As a result, these artists have to find other platforms for shoeing their work.

In these circumstances, Internet can be an option, even though there are many obstacles put by the regime to restrain it. Internet offers everyone an opportunity to live differently and it has changed the meaning of the "public space." It is in these new "public spaces" that contemporary Iranian artists, amateurs or professionals show their works to avoid censorship and repression.

The best example of this is what happened during the Green Movement. Famous and anonymous artists in different fields expressed their opinions on Internet. This phenomenon was so spectacular that Mir Hossein Mousavi, the winner of the 2009 presidential elections, talked about an "Army of Art" to describe it (26). Even the most famous traditional singer in Iran, Shajarian, who has always been granted authorization for his works, sang for the Green Movement and against repression. He put his non-authorized song online free of charge (27). Every time the political climate in Iran deteriorates, the conditions for the artists worsen and they have to adapt and find ways to show or broadcast their works.

Notes:

1. Iran newspaper 06/06/2002
2. http://im.farhang.gov.ir/fa/press/2press/11press
3. http://old.mehrnews.com/fa/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsId=784979
4. Ebtekar newspaper 01/05/2012
5. http://www.cyberpolice.ir/
6. http://peyvandha.ir/0-8.htm
7. http://www.dadna.ir/fa/news/16201/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%86+%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84
8. http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/pages/?cid=63262

9.http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/277342/%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%A7%DA%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4%DA%A9%D9%86

10.http://www.aftabir.com/articles/view/computer_internet_infortmation_technology/internet_network/c14c1225281581_filtering_internet_p1.php/%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%85%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B9%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C%D8%AF

11. http://surveillance.rsf.org/en/

12. A journalist and a supporter of the constitutional revolution 1871-1923

13. History of the Dissolution of Parliament. Ahmad Majd-ol-Eslam. Adaptation Mahmod Khalilpour. Esfehan. 1972. p.165

14. Tozih-ol-masael. Roh-ol-allah Khomini. Ghom. 1973; p.600 / Tozih-ol-masael. Front cover 2. dal marja. Dafrat Gohm 2000. P. 803,802 / Tozil-ol-masael. Mohammad Golpayegani. Sadr. 1986. p. 543, 385

15. Sharq newspaper. 08/31/2010

16. Ali-Akbar Sa'idi Sirjani (December 12th, 1931 in Sirjan - 28 November 1994 Tehran) was an Iranian writer, poet and journalist who died in prison under mysterious circumstances.http://www.ssirjani.com/

17. http://www.rahesabz.net/story/42913/

18. See 17

19. One of the underground metal band, Kahtmayan: http://www.kahtmayan.com/. A famous underground rap singer, Hichkas http://hichkas.me/

20. http://www.dw.de/%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%82%DB%8C-%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D9%BE%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86/a-15963426

21. http://www.magiran.com/article.asp?AID=34

22. http://rsf-persan.org/article16855.html

23. http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2012/05/120514_l21_caricature_arak_court.shtml

24. Etemad newspaper 25.05.2006

25. http://www.mardomak.org/cartoons

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Racial/Ethnic Politics and Development in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania[1]

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Abstract

Memories of the period of violent conflict in the Senegal River valley during the late 1980s-early 1990s remain vivid for many Mauritanians who lived through the events. Since that time, black Mauritanians of the Pulaar-speaking minority feel like strangers in their own country, marginalized by the Mauritanian government, which is dominated by the Arabic-speaking segments of the population. The river valley, where the majority of Pulaar speakers in Mauritania live, lags behind other regions of the country in terms of development. In the view of people who live there, customary modes of production (farming and herding) can no longer adequately sustain community livelihoods, while their ability to take up modern modes of production suffers from the lack of local income-generating activities as well as the highly substandard educational services provided by the state. With families and communities trapped in cycles of poverty, strong bitterness and resentment exists towards the Arabic-speaking political and social elite who have accumulated substantial wealth from their privileged position. Ethnic and racial conflict remains a concern moving forward; yet, many Pulaar speakers are careful to stress that underdevelopment and inequality are the main issues that must be tackled by local, national, and international communities coming together. For these people, cooperation and solidarity across ethnic, racial, and linguistic lines is the best way forward, as well as the best way to avoid a repeat of the violent events which happened just over two decades ago.

Key words: *Ethnicity, Development, Mauritania, Pulaar, Underdevelopment, Ethnic Conflict, Marginality, Solidarity.*

In April of 1989, social tensions in the Senegal River valley of West Africa came to a head and erupted in violence that brought the countries that share the region, Senegal and Mauritania, to the brink of war. While full-scale hostilities were kept in check, there were many left dead or wounded in urban rioting. Thousands more were imprisoned, deported, forcibly evicted from their homes and communities, and/or dispossessed. For the next few years, the river valley zone became the theater for low-scale guerrilla warfare, particularly on the Mauritanian side. Many of those who had fled across the border to escape the violence crossed over periodically to try to reclaim their livestock and other possessions.[2] Diplomatic relations between the two countries ceased during this period, casting a cloud over intraregional stability. For many observers, one of the more salient aspects to this episode of conflict and turmoil was the racial and ethnic differences of the antagonists. Mauritanians who were deported from Senegal were, by and large, from the Arabo-Berber *Bidhane* group, while north of the river, the targets of violence were the Black African communities of Pulaar,[3] Wolof, or Soninke ethnicity. For Mauritania – which under colonialism was primarily a buffer zone between France's[4] North and West African colonies, receiving very little in terms of administrative, economic, or infrastructural development – these events served to establish the tone of national identity, which has increasingly shifted towards an Arab rather than African one.

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[2] Philippe Marchesin, *Tribus, ethnies et pouvoir en Mauritanie* (Paris, FR: Éditions Karthala, 1992), 215, and Riccardo Ciavolella, "*Huunde fof ko politik*: everything is politics: Gramsci, Fulani, and the margins of the State in Mauritania," *Africa Today* 58 (2012): 14.

[3] To be most accurate, Pulaar is not an ethnic group, but the language spoken by two groups who have long resided in the Senegal River valley, the largely sedentary Toroɓe and the transhumant Fulɓe (in other parts of West Africa, the language is known as Fulfulde). While these two groups recognize and maintain differences and distinctions among themselves, the fact that they share a common language grants a level of cohesion when it comes to the internal politics of Mauritania. For the purposes of this essay, the designation 'Pulaar,' when used as a descriptor, refers to these two groups collectively.

[4] France asserted its claim to the territory largely as a strategic buffer, preventing any of its rivals from getting a foothold on the border of its established colonies in Algeria to the north or the Senegal and Niger River valleys in West Africa. In departure from the *mission civilatrice* which the French colonial project pursued throughout West and Central Africa, the aim in the territory which acquired the name Mauritania was largely pacification i.e. to work through the existing local power structures to minimize threats to colonial hegemony (Ould Mey 76-77). These colonial-era power structures tended to be segmentary, tribal, and clan-based, to minimize resistance to the French presence in the area without interfering significantly in the lives of the populations who lived in the area. These circumstances of colonialism were unique in this part of the continent, and the experience of Mauritania as it emerged as an independent state in 1960 departs substantially from that of its neighbors to the south or to the north.

However, despite the apparent racial and ethnic character of this turmoil, voices within the Mauritanian public discourse are loath to highlight or dwell upon this aspect. Many in Mauritania harbor painful memories and resentments from the events of two decades ago and Black Mauritanians continue to feel marginalized by state and society. Ten years ago, a Pulaar speaker who had been imprisoned during the 1989 unrest, told me outright that he hates Arabs and that he wished that he could join the US army so that he could go over to Iraq and kill Arabs. This strong sentiment is something you might hear in confidence; but the subject of race and ethnicity and its role in past violence has been virtually taboo in public discussion, which one might interpret as a fear of speaking out. Mauritania has never rated well when it comes to the degree to which its citizens have freedom of expression.[5]

However, to dwell solely on the racial and ethnic dimensions of Mauritanian society misses a larger story – vast inequality in the political, economic, and social spheres.[6] John and Jean Comaroff have suggested that inequality, or "the asymmetric incorporation of structurally dissimilar groupings into a single political economy" is one of the main driving forces behind tribalism[7] and ethnocentrism.[8] The pull of ethnic identity can draw in those who receive or expect little from the state in terms of furthering their own socioeconomic development. Ethnicity, as Mahmood Mamandi argues, has a history rooted in colonialism as a mode of colonial control *as well as* the mode of resistance against such control.[9] If these theses are valid, then the problem of ethnicity and race in Mauritania is not intractable. However, given the state of Mauritania's development, or lack thereof, the potential for violent conflict along racial and/or ethnic lines remains palpable, casting a cloud over Mauritanian society. What follows is a brief sketch of how Pulaar communities in the Senegal River valley, the

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[5] Desha M. Girod and Meir R. Walters, "Elite-led democratisation in aid-dependent states: the   case of Mauritania," *The Journal of North African Studies* 17 (2012): 181-193.

[6] See Ould Mey's discussion on the reemergence of tribalism and ethnicity arising through social and economic insecurity associated with denationalization of the state and economy along with the implementation of structural adjustment policies (232-239).

[7] Tribalism pervades the terrain of intraethnic socioeconomic and political relations for each of Mauritania's ethnic groups. The tribalist structure varies between the different ethnicities, but, in general, there are elite castes, occupational castes, and servile castes. For example, the *Bidhane*, the precolonial nobility was the warrior caste (*Hassan*) and the scholarly marabout class (*Zawiya*), with the warriors having the upper hand, while the tributary caste (*Znaga*) and slave castes (*Abeid*) occupied the lowest rungs (Marchesin 34-41). For Pulaar speakers, the structure is similar, though the warrior caste (S*ebbe*) occupy a lower place within the social heirarchy (Marchesin 59-63).

[8] John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, *Ethnography and the Historical Imagination* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 54.

[9] Mahmood Mamandi, *Citizen and Subjet: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 24.

Fuuta, view the conditions of their own marginality, and their own ideas for how to move forward to achieve greater social harmony.

Development in the Fuuta: Missing in Action.

"*Baleejo ko koɗo e nder leydi mum.*" This is a phrase I heard frequently while traveling through the Fuuta region. This phrase is in Pulaar and it translates to "A black person is a stranger in [his or her] own country." The statement is a simple and profound expression of the marginalization experienced by Pulaar speakers living in the Fuuta and all throughout the country. I heard it first from the chief of a village of newly repatriated former refugees, explaining his frustration at the slow pace at which the Mauritanian state addressed the infrastructural and development needs of his community four years and counting after their return. According to him, the state invited his community to return, granting them land with which to rebuild their villages. But despite great fanfare on the part of the state marking the return of those who had fled the violence of twenty years prior, many community members have been unable to secure adequate housing or work, and, in his estimation, only about half of the people have obtained their citizenship documents, meaning that they are still in limbo as far as citizenship rights are concerned. Mauritanians who have the education and experience to work as civil servants, and do not have their paperwork in order means that they cannot be hired for such positions. The prolonged period of reintegration along with the lack of development assistance from the state has the chief of this village concluding that "*to wono haŋki ɗo haa hande ko ɗoon woni*[10]."

It has not just been returned refugees who have faced recent difficulties with proper citizenship documentation. In May 2011, the government initiated a census enrollment along with an update and standardization of national identity cards, which all citizens need to travel, to get jobs, and to get access to social services. From the start, Black Mauritanians feared this process as an attempt by the government to deprive them of their citizenship. Many reports circulated saying that Blacks faced suspicions from census workers and officials regarding the validity of their national origins. Reportedly, census workers would test them on their knowledge of the country in order to prove that they belong.[11] In response, a protest movement coalesced against the census – calling itself Don't Touch My Nationality – with demonstrations and rioting occurring in September of 2011. State media reports that foreigners were responsible for the violent nature of these protests did little to assuage the concerns of Black Mauritanians, as this was the same pretense used to expel people from the country during the violence of the late 1980s.

The contention surrounding this issue indicates that race and ethnicity continue to play a large part in defining social differences within Mauritania. The state, for its part,

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[10] "The way it was before is the way things are now"

[11] Sebastian Kohn, *Fear and Statelessness in Mauritania*, Open Society Foundations, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/fear-and-statelessness-mauritania (Oct. 3, 2011), and Shirley Akraish, *"'Don't Touch My Nationality': Mauritania and its Allegedly Racist Census*, Africa and Diplomacy http://sites.davidson.edu/cis485/?p=3516#comments (Apr. 17, 2012).

is aware of this reality, and has to a certain extent attempted to reassure citizens that the census is not meant to exclude people from the South and that speakers of Hassaniya, Pulaar, Soninke, and Wolof are all integral components to the fabric of Mauritanian society. Yet, the fact that *Bidhane* occupy almost all of the highest levels of administration, the judiciary, security forces, finance and industry, and media[12] does little to inspire confidence in Fuutankoɓe that the state will look out for their interests in any tangible sense. Furthermore, the state's orientation towards the Arab world and the Arabization of state and society gives Black Mauritanians the impression that there is no place for them in the country.[13]

Fuutankoɓe tend to perceive their marginality most keenly in the realm of economic and social development. The primary productive activities of people in the region – agriculture and herding – are not part of the country's export economy, and therefore receive little government investment. Assistance in these areas has done little more than raising the cost of inputs for farming and herding, discouraging many from continuing to perform these activities. With the current structure of productive relations for these activities, headaches tend to outweigh benefits, and many have decided that continuing to farm and herd is a losing proposition. However, those who give up farming and herding do not have alternative local income-earning activities to provide for themselves and their families. Education is supposed to be the way forward for the future of Fuuta communities,[14] but the current state of education in the region indicates that this solution is just a mirage.

One of the most shocking things to observe in Fuuta communities is the impossible conditions in which children attend school, particularly when education is supposed to be the strategy by which individuals and communities can break the cycles of poverty and underdevelopment. Rather than paving the way forward, one finds the deck stacked firmly against these students in everything from the horrible quality of school facilities to the insufficient number of teachers (oftentimes there is only one or two teachers who are responsible for teaching all six levels of primary school) to the fact that they must learn two new languages – Arabic and French – before they can even begin to master the concepts and content of science, mathematics, history, etc. For many communities, state-run schools are hopeless, and they watch with resentment as members of the country's elite enroll their children in private school or send them abroad to receive better education. Meanwhile, their own children give up on school. In some communities, it is a rare or unheard of thing to have a student finish primary school and move on to secondary school.

One important point to take away from the preceding brief assessment of the economic and social underdevelopment of the Fuuta region is that the people who live there have the sense that their lives have gotten worse and more difficult over recent decades, not better. Their sociopolitical marginality in Mauritania also compounds the difficulty of their situation, as Black Mauritanians face undue scrutiny on a daily basis to prove the validity of their citizenship, while their absence from the highest levels of the national political elite limits their access to the economic advantages that have come

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[12] Moussa Bokara (Gelongal) Ba, personal interview, December 30, 2011.
[13] Marchesin, 344.
[14] Ciavolella, 14-15.

through this elite's comprador position.[15] With all of these combined circumstances, one would expect to see strong movements towards ethnically or racially based politics in the Fuuta, to see people rallying around their cultural identity as a source of stability in the face of poverty and underdevelopment.[16] However, there seems to be a great deal of caution on the part of Fuutankoɓe when it comes to engaging in political activity, particularly in using ethnic identity as a basis for political expression.

Harmonious Multiethnic Society: Possibility or Pipe Dream?

When speaking about the problems that Fuuta communities face in development, the absence of equality comes up again and again as a crucial political factor weighing upon the perspective of Black Mauritanians. The wealth with which members of the political elite have been able to transform their own lives is quite visible to the country's poor majority. The elite have built enormous villas in Nouakchott, have an appetite for luxury cars and products from Europe, and they have the ability to travel abroad for better education opportunities. Much of this wealth does not arise domestically, but flows in from the exterior through foreign aid and foreign investment. This situation establishes the political elite as a comprador class and keeps them beholden primarily to the interests of their external partners. The form of this relationship between the ruling elite and exterior partners – businesses, NGOs, governments – exacerbates inequality instead of reducing it, even in the face of critical development needs.[17] Because of the power, which the elite accumulates from their positions, they are, as Girod and Walters argue, virtually unaccountable to their own citizens and their concerns and needs.[18] The state is aware that it cannot completely ignore their citizens, though too often any actions geared towards addressing people's frustrations come off merely as lip service and manipulation of image, as seems to be the case with the negligence of returned refugee communities.

With a lack of trust in the government to address their needs, Fuutankoɓe feel that it would be better if NGOs and aid organizations bypassed the state all together, reducing the possibilities for embezzlement. Such a solution, though, would directly harm the interests of the state, considering that perhaps their greatest source of power lies in their management of inflows of aid money. Strong resistance from those in power would be likely, increasing the potential for violence on a scale as great as or greater than that of the conflict of the late 1980s. As noted at the outset, that conflict had resonant ethnic dimensions to it, with combatants grouping themselves on the basis of race and ethnicity.

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[15] Ciaovolella observes, "[h]ierarchies between groups are structured by their different powers in appropriating external resources [i.e. foreign aid or investment] and connecting to some national-level networks (10)." Such a dynamic lends itself to patron-client relations that have a strong tendency to organize themselves on lines of kinship, tribal, or ethnic affiliation.

[16] Some Fuuta youth have indeed started to look to political organization around their ethnicity to fight against their own marginalization, seeking to integrate their communities within the country's social structure. However, their efforts meet with skepticism and mistrust among their desired constituency (Ciaovolella 15).

[17] Girod and Walters, 185-186.

[18] Ibid., 189.

Yet, as Ould Mey demonstrated, internal pressures arising in the 80s from structural adjustment policies both in Mauritania and Senegal eroded social relations of production and dismantled the safety net of social services meant to ease citizens' transition from traditional to modern economic sectors. Each government found itself in the position where the prospect of external conflict presented a useful opportunity to strengthen their respective sovereign positions. [19] Ciaovolella's work, two decades after the events, corroborates this assessment, as, with hindsight, Fuutankoɓe generally view the trauma of that time as "a matter of state," which began to withdraw from its previous central role in national development. [20] This is not to say, though, that race and ethnicity played no role in the conflict; rather, ethnic and racial identification helped to draw the lines of friend and foe.

In Pulaar, the word *leñam-leñomaagu* denotes the concept of ethnocentrism and carries a connotation of negativity and danger. It is a tendency, which reared its head and took on a tragic character during the 1980s; but it also persists insidiously wherever fear and bitterness are palpable. When *leñam-leñomaagu* prevails and each community only takes care of its own, then development is impossible. Many Fuutankoɓe told me that they do not necessarily support the idea of having one of their own as president if that person would continue the trend of using the position of power to serve his or her own interests, the interests of his or her kin, and the interests of those who share the same ethnic/racial affiliation, all at the expense of the nation's other communities.

The opposite of *leñam-leñomaagu* is *jokkere enɗam*, solidarity, and *dental*, unity, and these are two of the most resonant positive concepts for Fuutankoɓe. [21] It has always been difficult to make a living in the harsh and volatile environmental conditions of the region, particularly without mechanization; communal production allowed Fuutankoɓe to get what they needed for survival. [22] Today, ecological forces are making such modes of existence even more challenging. However, political, economic, and social forces within the country and coming from abroad place enormous pressure on the social fabric of Fuuta communities. The strategy that many Fuutankoɓe seem to favor is to reconstitute *jokkere enɗam* and *dental* through building connections (*jokkondiral*) with interested and sympathetic parties in Mauritania and beyond. Reciprocity is a key component to such a strategy, rather than the donor-recipient dynamic, which tends to prevail in outside development relations. [23] Fuutankoɓe are eager to contribute their knowledge and skills

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[19] Mohameden Ould Mey, *Global Restructuring and Peripheral States: The Carrot and the Stick in Mauritania* (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 1996), 236-237.

[20] Ciaovolella, 9.

[21] Helen Regis, *Fulbe Voices: Marriage, Islam, and Medicine in Northern Cameroon* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 70.

[22] Ba interview, Dec. 30, 2011.

[23] The Pulaar language lends itself to the expression of reciprocity through the utilization of infixes, the insertion of one or two syllables into the middle of a verb or gerund, which take the place of prepositions in denoting meanings of association, instrumentality, duration, direction, causation, or reciprocity. The infix for reciprocity is *-ondir-*, and its presence in a word like *jokkondiral*, partnership, implies joining two groups together. A man with whom I spoke in a village near Boghé took great effort

towards improving the quality of life in their own communities and beyond, and certain localities have begun to decline offers of development assistance that offer finance or materials without close engagement with community members.[24]

In conclusion, racial and ethnic tensions pervade the national political and social scenes within Mauritania, but such tensions are not intractable, nor do they necessarily define people's social consciousnesses. However, the geopolitical context engenders stark inequalities and underdevelopment, which can strengthen ethnic and racial identity as a seemingly stable point on which to rally around in the face of uncertainty or hardship.[25] The vast majority of Mauritanian citizens live in extreme poverty, while a tiny minority has accumulated substantial wealth through the advantages of their political positions. Yet, while the injustice of the situation is easy enough to recognize, it is much more difficult to find a means to combat it and achieve more equitable balance without disrupting social harmony. Mauritania's recent history and the lessons its citizens have drawn from it indicate awareness that ethnocentrism, racism, and tribalism can have drastic consequences as prominent forms of political expression. For foreigners who interact and engage with Mauritanian communities, it is important to understand that some of the strongest forces which shape the current sociopolitical dynamics come from the outside, particularly global security measures, international development, and humanitarian concerns. As such, these forces are not neutral and in many ways can exacerbate inequality and strengthen racial and ethnic tension.

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to emphasize the idea of reciprocity in development relations with the following quote:

*Hankadi miin njidi tan ko **jokondirde** e mon **jokondiral** tiingal...e onon ne so tawi oɗon cokli **jokondirde** e amen oɗon mbaawi yettude numeruuji telephonaaji amen, so njehi kadi miin mbaasa **humpondirde** e moɗoon... eeywa miinen kadi so woon miijooji kesi joli e amen gaa kadi, miin mbaawa rookude on, kono so on njehi tan miinen noodata on tan e portabluuji mon, so ɓooyi oɗon mbaawi kuupude* (emphasis mine).

Translation:

Again, we want to be collaborate with you [through] a strong partnership...And if you happen to need to collaborate with us, you can take down our phone numbers, so when you leave, we can stay in touch and inform each other...Yes, again, for us, if new ideas emerge among us here, we can pass them [along] to you, but if you have left, we can just call you on your cell phones, and thus you can be informed.

[24] Samba Sandigui Ba, personal interview, January 22, 2012.
[25] Ould Mey, 232, and Ciaovolella, 10.

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